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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IFG LEASING COMPANY, : 
Plaintiff and Respondent, : APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
-v- : 
BONNEVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORP. : 
d/b/a/ RAMADA INN OF EVANSTON, Case No. 20634 
WYOMING; ECOTEK NATIONAL CORP. : 
n/k/a IRVING FINANCIAL CORP.; 
RODNEY F. GORDON; JIM HANSEN; and : 
FRANK A. NELSON, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
POINT ONE: THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FOUND THAT THE 
DISPOSITION OF THE COLLATERAL WAS NOT COMMERCIALLY 
REASONABLE AND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY 
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT. 
POINT TWO: HAVING FOUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S DISPOSITION OF A 
PART OF THE COLLATERAL WAS NOT COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF ANY DEFICIENCY 
JUDGMENT. 
POINT THREE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
APPELLANTS GUARANTEED THE LEASES IN QUESTION. 
POINT FOUR: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ANY JUDGMENT 
FOR RESIDUAL OR SALVAGE VALUE. 
POINT FIVE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Uniform Commercial Code, §9-504(3). (Corresponds to: §70A-9-504(3), 
U.C.A. 1953 and §34-21-963(c), Wyoming Statutes 1977.) §78-25-17, U.C.A. 
1953; §25-5-4(2) U.C.A. 1953. These sections are reproduced in the Addendum 
attached hereto. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff sued defendants in the court below for a deficiency judgment 
arising out of five personal property leases entered into between plaintiff, as 
lessor, and Bonneville Development Corporation, as lessee. Plaintiff joined 
the individual defendants (appellants here) claiming that they had guaranteed 
the leases. 
The leases in question were entered into between March, 1981 and 
September 1981 and concerned certain goods and equipment to be installed in 
the Ramada Inn of Evanston, Wyoming, which was owned by Bonneville 
Development Corporation. At the time of trial the plaintiff admitted that 
the lease agreements were in reality financing vehicles, and that they would 
be subject to the provision of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") (See 
Memorandum Decision R.207)* [Note: As used throughout this brief the 
reference fTR.ff refers to the number affixed by the clerk to the record on 
appeal; the reference fTTr." refers to the number affixed by the court reporter 
to the transcript of the testimony presented at the trial of this matter.] 
The leases in question were written on identical forms, but each bore 
a distinct identifying number. The guarantee documents were also printed on 
forms prepared by plaintiff, and the only thing which identified a guarantee 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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as applying to a specific lease was the identifying number of the lease which 
was typed on the guarantee document. The individual defendants testified 
that they had not executed any guarantees in connection with the leases in 
question (Tr. 120, 221-226, 247), but that they had executed certain guarantee 
documents in blank, which were delivered to plaintiff with respect to other 
proposed leases which plaintiff had subsequently declined to fund (Tr. 124-125, 
230, 248). They further testified that these lease guarantee forms were never 
returned to them after plaintiff declined to fund the proposed leases with 
which they were submitted (Tr. 134, 230, 248). No evidence was introduced 
to account for these forms. 
The trial court found that at the time the guarantee documents were 
executed they were undated and were not identified by any lease number 
(Findings of Fact No. 6 — See Addendum). In spite of this finding, and the 
lack of any evidence in the record as to how the identifying number got placed 
upon the guarantee documents, the trial court also found that the guarantee 
documents were executed by defendants in connection with the lease agreements 
in issue. 
In approximately May, 1982 Bonneville Development Corporation 
defaulted in the payment of the installments due under the lease agreements. 
At that time Mr. Joe Jimenez, who was then the Regional Collection Manager 
for plaintiff, wrote various letters in which he threatened to repossess the 
collateral (Tr. 194-197. See also Exhibits 52-D through 57-D). However, 
plaintiff did not repossess the collateral. 
Mr. Jimenez, who appeared as a witness, also testified that he searched 
the files relating to the leases in question, and that there were no personal 
-3-
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guarantees of the individual defendants in plaintiff's file (Tr. 200). He then 
discussed the absence of personal guarantees with various officials of the 
plaintiff company, and told them that there were no personal guarantees 
relating to these leases (Tr. 200-204). He testified that he had written a 
memorandum to the file relating to the lack of personal guarantees for these 
leases (Tr. 203). His testimony was uncontroverted. However, the memorandum 
was not produced in evidence nor was any evidence introduced by the plaintiff 
to explain its absence. 
Mr. Jimenez also testified that the normal operating procedure at the 
plaintiff company at that time in cases where there were personal guarantees, 
was to write a demand letter to the guarantors, and that would have been one 
of the first things he would have done had there been personal guarantees, 
but that due to the lack of personal guarantees relating to the leases in 
question he did not write any such letters to the individual defendants (Tr. 
205). No such letters were offered into evidence. 
Mr. Jimenez further testified that in searching the files of plaintiff 
he did find other files relating to "deals that had been turned down" in which 
he found personal guarantees which had been executed by these defendants 
(Tr. 201). He testified that these guarantees had not been filled in with a 
lease number and a date as of the time he saw them (Tr. 209). 
On October 5, 1982, the Ramada Inn of Evanston, Wyoming was placed 
in receivership (Tr. 46) by order of the district court in Wyoming at the request 
of Commercial Security Bank (Tr. 97). The receiver took possession of the 
lease collateral along with the motel facility (Tr. 98). At that time defendant 
Hansen requested that plaintiff repossess the lease collateral (Tr. 155-157). 
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The plaintiff sent a letter in which it threatened to repossess the collateral 
if the lease payments were not brought current by November 15, 1982 (See 
Exhibit 42-P). Although no payments were made (Tr. 66), plaintiff failed to 
repossess the collateral (Tr. 95), but left it on the premises where it could 
be used by the receiver during the time he was in possession (Tr. 98). As of 
the time of the sale approximately two years later, part of the equipment 
was missing and plaintiff had no knowledge as to where it was (Tr. 50). 
On May 31, 1983 Bonneville Development Corporation filed a petition 
in bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah (Tr. 46). 
No evidence was presented which would indicate that plaintiff made 
any effort to assert the priority of its security interest in the collateral as 
against the receiver or to obtain a ratification or disclaimer of the leases 
from the trustee in bankruptcy from October, 1982 until the property was 
finally sold. 
On September 28, 1984, plaintiff consummated a sale of part of the 
lease collateral to Commercial Security Bank ("Commercial Security") and First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. ("First Security") for the sum of $85,000.00 (Tr. 
88-98). The evidence showed that Commercial Security and First Security 
were creditors of Bonneville Development Corporation holding mortgages on 
the Ramada Inn of Evanston (Tr. 88). The negotiations for the sale of the 
collateral took place at the office of Commercial Security in Salt Lake City 
(Tr. 88), whereas the collateral was located at the Ramada Inn in Evanston, 
Wyoming (Tr. 95). The representatives of the banks had not inspected the 
equipment to ascertain its condition or value (Tr. 91-92), and neither plaintiff 
-5-
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nor the purchasers had prepared nor were the purchasers aware of any appraisal 
of the property (Tr. 91-93). 
From the testimony presented at the trial it would appear that the 
negotiations for the sale did not relate to the then-current condition or value 
of the collateral, but only to what percentage of "plaintiff's estimate of value" 
the purchasers would pay. The testimony showed that the agreed purchase 
price of $85,000.00 was based upon 18 percent of such value (Tr. 94-95). 
Evidence subsequently presented to the court would indicate that the term 
"plaintiff's estimate of value" really referred to the original cost of the 
equipment in the five leases as invoiced to plaintiff. (See Tr. 332, where the 
original cost was identified as $476,113.11. The purchase price of $85,000.00 
realized by plaintiff upon the sale of the collateral equates to 17.9 percent 
of $476,113.11.) 
Gerald M. Engstrom, Vice-President and General Counsel of 
Commercial Security testified that he personally participated with 
representatives of First Security and plaintiff in the negotiations in which the 
banks agreed to purchase the collateral. He could not specifically identify 
the date that the purchase agreement was negotiated. To the best of his 
recollection it was in the fall of 1983, but it could have been in the winter 
of 1983/1984, and it was at least six months before the purchase price was 
paid (Tr. 90-91). According to plaintiff's records, the purchase price was paid 
on September 28, 1984 (Tr. 49). 
On March 30, 1984 (which was after the commencement of the present 
action), counsel for plaintiff sent a notice to the individual defendants advising 
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them: "IFG intends to sell the equipment on or after the tenth day of April, 
1984, at public or private sale." (See Exhibit 43-P.) 
The evidence presented did not disclose any other effort on the part 
of plaintiff to sell the collateral. Specifically, the evidence did not show any 
attempt on the part of plaintiff to contact other potential purchasers, to 
dispose of the collateral through dealers in that type of equipment or to 
advertise the collateral in trade journals or any other type of media. 
The sale of the lease collateral to Commercial Security and First 
Security did not include a wood carving which plaintiff appropriated to its own 
use, allowing an offset therefor in the amount of $4,000.00 (Tr. 50). 
The only evidence presented by plaintiff as to value of the collateral 
was in the form of testimony by Susan Trunzo, who testified that she had 
been employed in the auction business for 15 years; that she had "looked 
through" the list of equipment attached to the bill of sale to Commercial 
Security and First Security and compared it with some invoices supplied by 
plaintiff (Tr. 165); that she had experience in selling restaurant equipment at 
auction (Tr. 168); and that she had sold office furnishings based upon her 
inspection and estimate of the value of the item (Tr. 169). However, she also 
admitted that she had not seen the equipment listed on the bill of sale (Tr. 
175, 179) and that she had no experience with respect to sales of heat 
exchangers, boilers and other types of heating equipment on the list (Tr. 169). 
Over objections raised by the defendants as to the foundation for her 
testimony and her qualifications to testify as to the value of the items listed 
on the bill of sale (particularly in view of her testimony that she had not seen 
the equipment) she was permitted by the trial court to testify that "a fair 
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market recovery for this equipment" would be "somewhere between 15 to 25 
percent" (Tr. 176). 
On cross examination she admitted that her estimate of percentage 
recovery was based upon an average value based upon her experience, rather 
than anything related to the specific value or condition of the items listed, 
since she had not seen the items on the equipment list (Tr. 179.) She also 
testified that in her experience the seller is always at a disadvantage and the 
sales price of an item is decreased if the item being sold is not seen by the 
buyer (Tr. 180); that in her experience no one would come to an auction sale 
if the seller did not contact known potential buyers and that she also would 
always advertise in newspapers, trade journals and by direct mail (Tr. 181-
182), and that "a commercial and reasonable auctioneer" would not attempt 
"such an auction as this without advertising" (Tr. 183), stating: "We would 
always advertise something like this." (Tr. 184.) 
In determining the purchase price of the collateral, Mr. Engstrom also 
testified that the buyers gave no value to the heat pumps "because we said 
they were permanently attached" (Tr. 96). However, another witness, Cal 
Gordon, testified that there were approximately 60 heat pumps at the Ramada 
Inn, of which about 50 were new and had never been installed or put into 
service (Tr. 186-187). In her testimony, Ms. Trunzo also testified that if 
equipment were new, her experience was that she would expect to get 75 to 
80 percent of their worth upon liquidation (Tr. 177). The invoices which 
plaintiff put into evidence showed that the original cost of the heat pumps 
amounted to $67,222.12. (See Exhibits 6-P and 13-P.) 
-8 -
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After the trial the court held that the individual defendants had 
guaranteed the leases in question, that the sale of the collateral at private 
sale by plaintiff was commercially reasonable and conformed to the 
requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code, except as to the wood carving 
which was retained by plaintiff and not sold, which the court found to be not 
commercially reasonable. After allowing an offset of $10,000.00 "for the price 
of this carving" (Conclusion of Law No. 3. See Addendum), the trial court 
awarded plaintiff judgment against the individual defendants for the sum of 
$822,623.22, plus attorney's fees in the amount of $13,485.00 and costs in the 
amount of $302.00. (See Judgment in Addendum.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendants respectfully contend that the trial court erred in finding 
that the plaintiff's disposition of any part of the collateral was commercially 
reasonable as required by the UCC. In support of this contention defendants 
submit that the evidence shows the plaintiff neglected the collateral and the 
interests of both plaintiff and defendants in the collateral: 
a. It clearly appeared that plaintiff failed to exercise any of its 
rights in the collateral, which left the collateral to be used by others for a 
period of approximately two and one-half years after default in the payment 
of the lease rental installments, and for approximately two years after plaintiff 
was requested by one of the alleged guarantors to repossess the equipment. 
b. In disposing of the equipment plaintiff made no attempt in good 
faith to obtain the best price it could for the collateral, such as by advertising 
or contacting dealers in this type of equipment or other potential purchasers. 
-9-
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It merely contacted the entities who were in possession of the facility where 
the equipment was situated and where it had been used without payment for 
at least two years, and entered into negotiations with them which were not 
directed at obtaining any price based upon the value of the collateral at that 
time. 
c. The consequence of failing to dispose of the collateral for the 
leases in a commercially reasonable manner is that plaintiff is not entitled to 
any deficiency judgment. 
In addition to the foregoing, plaintiff retained for its own use part 
of the leased property, described as a piece of art. The trial court properly 
found that the disposition of this part of the collateral was not commercially 
reasonable. However, based upon such finding the trial court also should have 
held that plaintiff had failed to dispose of the collateral as required by the 
UCC and should have denied plaintiff any deficiency judgment. 
It is further respectfully submitted that plaintiff failed to prove by 
proper legal standards that these defendants had ever guaranteed the leases 
in question. 
A decision on this appeal favorable to the defendants on any of the 
foregoing matters would require a reversal of the judgment entered below in 
its entirety. If this appeal were not to result in such a decision, defendants 
contend that this court should still enter an order reversing the judgment in 
part based upon the final two arguments of defendants. 
Defendants contend that the court erred in including in the judgment 
any sum based upon the residual value of the collateral because under the 
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terms of the lease there is no obligation upon the lessee to pay the lessor for 
its residual value. 
Defendants also contend that the court erred in awarding attorneys 
fees to plaintiff in excess of $10,000.00, based upon the evidence presented 
at the trial. The inclusion of this argument is not intended to constitute an 
admission by defendants that plaintiff is entitled to any sum as attorneys fee. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FOUND THAT THE 
DISPOSITION OF THE COLLATERAL WAS NOT COMMERCIALLY 
REASONABLE AND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY 
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT. 
The trial court stated in its Memorandum Decision: 
"The parties agree that although these are designated as 
leases, they are in effect financing agreements, and that the 
Uniform Commercial Code applies. Therefore, it was the 
obligation of the plaintiff to preserve the assets, and to sell 
them in a commercially reasonable manner." (R.207.) 
UCC §9-504(3), enacted in Utah as §70A-9-504(3) (see copy in 
Addendum), allows a secured party after default to dispose of collateral, but 
it requires that "every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, 
time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable." 
The courts of a majority of the states which have enacted the UCC 
(including both Utah and Wyoming) have taken the position that any failure 
on the part of the security holder to dispose of the collateral in a commercially 
reasonable manner will result in a denial of the right to obtain a judgment 
for any deficiency between the contract balance due and the proceeds of the 
sale of the collateral. 
- 1 1 -
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The leading case in Utah on this point is FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-
Printers, 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979), which holds that in an action for a deficiency 
judgment the secured party has the burden of establishing that the disposition 
of the collateral was done in a commercially reasonable manner. In that case 
the creditor failed to conduct the sale in a commercially reasonable manner 
and was barred from obtaining a deficiency judgment. 
It is respectfully submitted that a comparison of the significant 
elements in Pro-Printer, supra, with the facts concerning the disposition of 
the collateral in the instant case will demonstrate that IFG Leasing Co. made 
even less effort to conduct a commercially reasonable sale. 
PRO-PRINTER CASE THE INSTANT CASE 
1. Defendant requested that 
secured party repossess equipment. 
2. Secured party repossessed 
equipment and stored it six months 
before selling it. 
3. Creditor "contacted only three 
dealers" in selling equipment. 
4. Creditor made no attempt to 
advertise equipment in local journals 
normally used for that purpose. 
5. Creditor sold equipment to 
owner of place where equipment was 
stored. 
6. Creditor had appraised equip-
ment a few months before sale. 
7. Sale price was less than half of 
appraised value, and only 21% of the 
original invoice cost. 
1. Defendant requested that IFG 
repossess equipment. 
2. IFG failed to repossess equipment 
but left it to be used for two years 
prior to selling it. 
3. IFG made no contact with dealers 
or potential purchasers. 
4. IFG made no attempt to advertise 
equipment in any media. 
5. IFG sold equipment to banks in 
possession of facility where equipment 
was located and where it had been 
used. 
6. IFG made no appraisal of equip-
ment. 
7. Equipment sold for 18% of IFG?s 
original invoice cost. 
-12-
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Courts generally have recognized that the UCC was designed to provide 
an economical, extra-judicial method for disposing of the collateral after 
default. Recognizing that the secured creditor is pretty much unsupervised 
in selecting the method of disposition and in carrying it out, the courts have 
tended to balance the flexibility given creditors by imposing upon them the 
burden of proving that their disposition of the collateral was conducted in a 
manner calculated to protect the debtor's interest as well as their own interest 
in the resale of the collateral. The courts have noted that these requirements 
serve the interests of creditors as well as debtors, because producing a greater 
return upon sale of the collateral reduces the necessity of seeking a deficiency 
from guarantors. Therefore, if the secured creditor fails to show that it 
disposed of the collateral having due regard for the interests of the debtor, it 
is fair that the creditor should lose any right to recover a deficiency from 
the debtor and the guarantors, if any. 
While the requirement of a "commercially reasonable" manner cannot 
be defined with precision, it clearly means that in disposing of the coUatereal 
the secured party must make a good faith effort to obtain a fair price for 
the collateral, rather than to neglect the collateral and focus its efforts upon 
recovering a deficiency from guarantors. 
In this case the record shows that plaintiff commenced this action to 
recover the full balance claimed from the alleged guarantors prior to taking 
any action with respect to the collateral. 
In Chittenden Trust Co. v. Maryanski, 415 A.2d 206 (Vt. 1980), the 
Supreme Court of Vermont explained the duty underlying the "commercially 
reasonable" standard as follows: 
- 1 3 -
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ff§9-504(3) places a positive duty on the secured party 
to act, with respect to every aspect of disposition, in a 
commercially reasonable manner . . . . Although the specifics 
of this duty Tcannot be meaningfully described except in terms 
of particular fact situations,1 . . . in general it means that 
T[t]he secured party is required to utilize his best efforts to 
sell the collateral for the best price and to have a reasonable 
regard for the debtorfs interests • • . • Of course, the fact 
that a better price could have been obtained does not 
necessarily mean that the sale was not commercially 
reasonable, . . . but the secured party must make a good 
faith effort to maximize the value of the collateral . . . ." 
(Emphasis added.) (All authority cited has been omitted.) 
In that case among the key considerations which led the court to hold 
that the disposition of the collateral was not commercially reasonable was 
evidence that the collateral (restaurant equipment) was sold to the owners of 
the building in which the defendants restaurant had been located (with no 
discussion of any efforts to find other potential purchasers) and that the 
equipment, which was two years old and worth $63,000 when new, had been 
sold for "only $12,000." (It is interesting to note that the sale price in that 
case equalled 18.3% of its new value.) 
The Supreme Court of Vermont concluded: 
"Under any construction of [the] evidence, findings 
sufficient to support a conclusion that plaintiff carried its 
burden of showing a commercially reasonable disposition of 
collateral would be clearly erroneous. The evidence simply 
does not support the result reached, . . . and therefore the < 
result cannot stand." (Id., 415 A.2d at 209-210.) 
In the instant case the record does not show that plaintiff made any 
good faith effort to maximize the value of the collateral, or that it used its 
best efforts to sell the collateral for the best price it could obtain or that it 
had any regard for the interests of the defendants in the collateral. 
The disposition of the collateral by plaintiff occurred almost as an 
afterthought, and was clearly done without any attempt to obtain any substantial 
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return. Plaintiffs actions in regard to the collateral demonstrate an 
indifference which falls far short of the judicial requirements of a commercially 
reasonable disposition. 
In In re Hamby, 19 BR 776, 33 UCCRS 1811 (U.S. Bankruptcy Ct., 
ND Ala. 1982) the court stated: 
"Commercial transactions must have as their purpose the 
obtaining of a profit as opposed to the incurring of a loss, 
if they are to be deemed reasonable. A method of sale 
which produces only one bid and a sale at 15% below wholesale 
value is calculated to produce a commercial loss and if such 
a method is consistent and is persisted in, a commercial or 
business failure will result. It is not a reasonable method 
in the commercial setting. If the method of sale employed 
by the claimant was not of this character, appropriate 
distinctions should have been shown by the secured party." 
In the case of Peoples Acceptance Corp. v. Van Epps, 60 Ohio App.2d 
100, 395 N.E.2d 912 (1978) the court stated: 
"The standards which should be used to determine a 
commercially reasonable sale are matters of fairness and 
business practice. The secured party should always attempt 
to sell the repossessed collateral for the best price possible, 
and where there is a gross discrepancy between the disposal 
and the original sale price of the repossesed collateral, there 
must be some affirmative showing on the part of the secured 
party that the terms of the repossession sale were 
commercially reasonable." 
That case involved a situation where the secured party brought suit 
against a debtor for a deficiency after repossessing and selling a motor vehicle. 
The purchaser had agreed to pay $1,989.00 for the car which was sold following 
repossession nine months later for $200.00. The court held that "the price 
for which a vehicle is sold after repossession is one of the Ttermsf which must 
be considered in determining whether or not a sale is commercially reasonable 
as required by the Uniform Commercial Code." (Id., 395 N.E.2d at 916.) The 
court noted in its decision that the record was devoid of any testimony 
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regarding the condition of the car or its fair market value at the time of the 
repossession sale, that the sale of the car was not advertised, that the car 
was sold at private sale for little more than one-tenth of its original purchase 
price, and concluded that the sale was not commercially reasonable. 
In the case at bar, the record also discloses (in addition to the other 
factors mentioned above) that the deficiency claimed by plaintiff and awarded 
by the trial court against defendants was approximately ten times the amount 
realized by plaintiff from its disposition of the collateral. 
In Mercantile Financial Corp. v. Miller, 292 F.Supp. 797 (1968), the 
court stated: 
"The evidence also indicated that Mercantile [the secured 
party] neither sold these assets Tin the usual manner in any 
recognized market thereforeT nor that it Tsold in conformity 
with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the 
type of property sold * * * T, §9-507(2). It conducted this 
auction with only a minimal amount of publicity, . . . . 
Mercantilefs failure to locate likely purchasers of these assets 
and its eagerness to conduct a sale at which it knew only 
one bid would be made, and that by a bidder . . . who had 
no knowledge of the local market for these assets, strongly 
supports Miller?s contention that this sale was not in 
conformity with §9-504. The conduct of this auction differed 
markedly from the conduct of a general auction of such 
materials described as Commercially reasonable' by the 
defendants expert witness." (Emphasis added.) 
In addition to the similarity of the underlined portion of material 
quoted above to the facts of this case, at the trial of this matter the plaintiff 
produced as a witness an auctioneer, who testified on cross-examination that 
from her experience the sales price would be decreased if the items being 
sold were not exhibited at the sale; that in making sales she would always 
advertise the sale in newspapers, trade journals and by direct mail; that she 
would also make an effort to contact potential buyers; and that an auctioneer 
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would not be commercially reasonable to attempt to make a sale without 
advertising (Tr. 179-184). The record discloses no effort by plaintiff to observe 
even these minimal precautions in disposing of the collateral for the leases in 
issue. 
In In re: Thomas, 12 UCCRS 578 (1973) the court pointed out that 
UCC §9-504(3) provides that collateral may be liquidated at either public or 
private sale. A public sale was stated to be one in which due advertisement 
of the sale is made to the public to attend and bid. The court then stated: 
"On the other hand, disposition by private sale 
contemplates that the creditor has used some diligence to 
obtain buyers who will submit private bids for the property. 
It is not sufficient, nor can it be said to be a commercially 
reasonable disposition, to park a vehicle in some obscure lot 
surrounded by a fence and make such display the only means 
whereby a private bid might be lodged with the creditor by 
a prospective buyer. Here there is no evidence that any 
designated party viewed the vehicle or submitted a bid or 
declined to do so. No specific party was pointed out in the 
evidence except the purchaser . . . ." 
In the instant case the collateral was not parked on some obscure lot 
and surrounded by a fence. However, the circumstances were not significantly 
different than had it been so placed. The collateral was situated in Evanston, 
Wyoming, while the sale was negotiated in Salt Lake City; the extent, condition 
and value of the collateral was not demonstrated to the purchaser by the 
secured party; and, the only subject of the negotiation between the parties 
related to the percentage of the original invoice price that would be paid by 
the purchaser. Furthermore, although more than six months elapsed between 
the date the sale was negotiated and the date it was consummated, the record 
is devoid of any evidence that the plaintiff made any effort whatever during 
this interim to obtain a better price for the collateral. 
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On the contrary, there is a clear inference in the testimony that 
plaintiff did not make any such effort. At the trial Mr. Bruce Reading, counsel 
for plaintiff, took the stand and among other things, testified: ". . . at the 
time that letter went out I knew we were in the final preparations of selling 
the equipment to the bank and I also knew that, in all likelihood, the sale 
would take place with the bank." (Tr. 256-257.) The letter he referred to 
was dated March 30, 1984 (see Exhibit 43-P). The sale was consummated on 
September 28, 1984 (Tr. 49). 
There is no evidence in the record which even suggests that plaintiff 
took any steps to assert its security interest in the collateral against the 
receiver or the trustee in bankruptcy, by reason of which the collateral was 
used without any payment being made on the leases for more than two years. 
In Wayne Bank v. Pore, 119 Mich.App. 634, 326 N.W.2d 588 (1982) 
the plaintiff had a security interest in the inventory of a debtor corporation, 
which the Internal Revenue Service had confiscated pursuant to a tax lien. 
Even though its security interest in the inventory was superior to the interest 
of the Internal Revenue Service, plaintiff did not contact the Internal Revenue 
Service in any manner to assert its prior lien on the collateral. Rather, eight 
weeks later plaintiff notified the defendant, seeking to enforce defendant's 
obligation under a guaranty. 
The trial court held that plaintiff had acted in a commercially 
unreasonable manner by failing to notify the Internal Revenue Service of its 
prior interest in the inventory. The Court of Appeals of Michigan noted that 
UCC §1-102(3) requires that a secured party exercise good faith, diligence, 
reasonableness and care. The court held that the failure of the secured party 
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to notify the Internal Revenue Service and defendant constituted an unjustifiable 
failure to meet the standards set forth in §1-102(3). Since this formed the 
basis of the finding of the trial court that the plaintiff had acted in a 
commercially unreasonable manner, the judgment of the trial court was 
affirmed. 
It is respectfully submitted that the acts of plaintiff in the disposition 
of the collateral must be viewed in their totality, and that the failure of 
plaintiff to assert its security interest in the collateral against the receiver 
and the trustee in bankruptcy further indicates that the plaintiff did not dispose 
of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. 
In Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corporation v. Atlas Shirt 
Company, Inc., 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1971) the court stated: 
"The burden on the secured creditor is by no means 
onerous. If he wishes a deficiency judgment he must obey 
the law, the relevant provisions of which are now simpler 
and more flexible than before. If he does not obey the law 
he may not secure a deficiency judgment." 
It should also be noted here that the lease guarantee forms which 
the plaintiff relied upon in bringing suit against appellants provided that in 
the event any controversy or claim arose out of the guaranty, any questions 
of law should be decided in accordance with the laws of Wyoming. (See 
Exhibits 2-P, 9-P, 16-P, 23-P and 30-P.) 
The State of Wyoming has enacted the Uniform Commercial Code. 
The Wyoming equivalent of UCC §9-504(3) is found substantially unchanged as 
§34-21-963(c) Wyoming Statutes, 1977. (See Addendum.) 
The decisions of the Wyoming Supreme Court are consistent with the 
decisions cited above, and among other things clearly hold that the secured 
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party has the burden of pleading and proving that its disposition of the collateral 
was in strict compliance with the requirements of §9-504(3), Failure to do 
so will prevent the creditor from obtaining a judgment for any deficiency 
between the unpaid balance and the sale price of the collateral. See, Aimonetto 
v. Keepes, 501 P.2d 1017 (Wyo. 1972). 
In Eggeman v. Western National Bank, 596 P.2d 318 (Wyo. 1979), the 
Wyoming Supreme Court further stated: 
TtA judicial sale cannot be held in a Tgrab bagf fashion. 
Such a sale would not be commercially reasonable. All parties 
to the sale must have an opportunity to see and evaluate 
the goods being sold." 
Evidence presented at trial clearly shows that plaintiff failed to meet 
the standards of a commercially reasonable disposition of the collateral sold 
to Commercial Security and First Security, and therefore, that the judgment 
of the trial court should be reversed. 
POINT TWO: HAVING FOUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S DISPOSITION 
OF A PART OF THE COLLATERAL WAS NOT COMMERCIALLY 
REASONABLE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF 
ANY DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT. 
The trial court held that the retention by plaintiff of the wood carving 
was not a commercially reasonable disposition. However, the trial court also 
held that the plaintiff's disposition of the remaining collateral was commercially 
reasonable. (Conclusions of Law Nos. 2 and 3. See Addendum.) 
it is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred in so holding, 
inasmuch as the requirement of the UCC is that T\ . . every aspect of the 
disposition . . . must be commercially reasonable." The UCC does not say that 
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to the extent that the disposition is found to be commercially reasonable the 
creditor may obtain a deficiency judgment. 
The case of DeLay First National Bank and Trust Company v. Jacobson 
Appliance Co., 196 Neb, 398, 243 N.W2d 745 (1976) involved a situation where 
a secured creditor disposed of the collateral in several transactions. As stated 
by the Supreme Court of Nebraska: 
"The problem herein is that there was more than one 
sale, some of which can be upheld. We believe the intent 
of the Uniform Commercial Code would appear to mandate 
that the entire disposition of collateral by the secured party 
be viewed as one transaction, and that every aspect of that 
transaction be in accord with the requirements of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. To adopt any other rule would place upon 
the court the sometimes impossible and time-consuming task 
of attempting to determine the amount of recoverable 
deficiency as well as the amount of unrecoverable deficiency. 
What we said in Bank of Gering v. Glover, [192 Neb. 
575, 223 N.W.2d 56 (1974)], is pertinent herein: !The creditor 
is given several options in disposing of collateral and very 
minimal formal requirements. The burden on the secured 
creditor is to comply with the law. The act is framed in 
his interest. It is not onerous to require him to give notice 
of the time and place of sale. In some instances it will be 
to the creditors advantage to do so. On the other hand, to 
permit him to proceed otherwise does place an onerous burden 
on the debtor/ 
"We adhere to the position we adopted in Bank of Gering 
v. Glover, supra. The right to a deficiency judgment depends 
on compliance with the statutory requirements. We now hold 
that if a creditor wishes a deficiency judgment he must 
comply with the law in each transaction. While this rule 
may seem harsh, we are persuaded by the fact that the 
burden is on the secured creditor to comply with the law. 
The act is framed in his interest. It is not onerous to require 
him to observe the provision of the law." (Emphasis added.) 
In the case of Jackson State Bank v. Beck, 577 P.2d 168 (Wyo. 1978), 
the Supreme Court of Wyoming ruled to the same effect. In that case the 
plaintiff had repossessed the assets (consisting of parts, inventory, used vehicles, 
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tools, equipment, furniture and fixtures) of an automobile dealer. The bank 
"sold" the collateral to itself by entering a credit upon certain promissory 
notes after giving notice to the debtors (including the defendant Beck, who was 
a guarantor) that after a specified date all collateral would be sold at private 
sale pursuant to the UCC. 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming noted that §9-504(3) contains the 
following provision: 
"The secured party may buy at any public sale and if 
the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized 
market or is of a type which is the subject of widely 
distributed standard price quotations he may buy at a private 
sale." 
The opinion of the court indicated that the collateral was not of the 
type indicated in that provision. Therefore, the court rejected the argument 
of the creditor that even though it had violated the commercial code, the 
trial court was in error in finding that the bank operated in a commercially 
unreasonable fashion. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the violation of a specific 
statute is commercially unreasonable as a matter of law. However, the court 
also recognized that the courts are not in agreement as to the penalty to be 
imposed upon the creditor in such situations. After analyzing the holding of 
various states on the subject, the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that the 
law in Wyoming had been settled in the case of Aimonetto v. Keepes, supra. 
where the court stated: 
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rt* « * [w]e are persuaded that one general principle 
upon which plaintiffs rely is applicable here, . that is, 
compliance with §34-9-504(3) is a condition precedent to 
recovery of any deficiency between sale price of collateral 
and the amount of the unpaid balance." (Emphasis added.) 
Consequently, the court sustained the trial court and denied the secured 
party any deficiency judgment. 
The evidence in this case showed that a wood carving (described in 
the testimony by plaintiff's witness as "a piece of art" — Tr. 50.) formed part 
of the collateral for the leases in question, and that it was retained by plaintiff 
rather than sold with the other collateral. 
Plaintiff's witness testified that plaintiff "as the current owner of 
that art piece" had assigned it a value of $4,000.00, although it was originally 
invoiced to plaintiff for $2,000.00 (Tr. 50). 
Defendant Hansen, however, testified that the invoiced price to 
plaintiff was only a part of the total price Bonneville Development Corporation 
had paid for the carving; that $4,000.00 was not a fair price for it because, "It 
is one of a kind. It was featured in a number of articles. It is a great piece 
of work." (Tr. 159.) Although he was an officer of the corporation which 
had owned the art work, Mr. Hansen was not permitted by the trial court to 
give his opinion of the value of the work, but he was permitted to testify that 
he felt that the total purchase price paid for it by the corporation was 
$10,000.00. (Tr. 160.) 
The trial court held that the "sale" of the wood carving was not 
commercially reasonable and allowed an offset therefor in the amount of 
$10,000.00. (Conclusion of Law No. 3.) 
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It is respectfully submitted in view of the authority cited above that 
the trial court was correct in ruling that the plaintiff had not disposed of the 
art piece in a commercially reasonable manner, but that the trial court should 
have ruled also that plaintiff's failure to comply with §9-504(3) in its disposition 
of all of the collateral barred the recovery of any deficiency judgment. 
POINT THREE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
APPELLANTS GUARANTEED THE LEASES IN QUESTION. 
Evidence was presented at the trial with regard to guarantee 
agreements executed by defendants which plaintiff asserted showed that the 
defendants had guaranteed the leases in question. 
The alleged guarantees were marked as Exhibits 2-P, 9-P, 16-P, 23-P 
and 30-P. All of these documents bore dates prior to December 31, 1981. 
The witness who introduced these exhibits, Ms. B. J . Rakes, testified that she 
was not employed by plaintiff until January 4, 1984, and that she first received 
the records concerning this case at the end of July, 1984 (Tr. 13). 
The testimony of Ms. Rakes which served as the foundation for the 
introduction into evidence of Exhibit 2-P is as follows: 
"Q (By Mr. Reading) B. J., you said those are guarantee 
documents; is that correct? 
"A That's correct. 
?TQ How do you know that they apply to this particular 
lease file? 
TtA They indicate that it is the Bonneville Development 
Corporation d.b.a. Ramada Inn, Evanstion, Wyoming with lease 
no. 56809. 
TTQ And that is the same lease number that is on 
Exhibit 1; is that correct? 
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"A That's correct. 
"Q Can you read the signature on the bottom of those 
documents? 
He He * $ $ 
"A (By the witness) Someone has signed the signature 
above Jim P. Hansen where it has been typed in as Jim P. 
Hansen. 
"Q (By Mr. Reading) What is the typed names on that 
document on the left of the guarantors? 
"A One is typed Rodney S. Gordon and one is typed 
Frank A. Nelson." (Tr. 14-17.) 
Subsequently, when Exhibit 2-P was offered into evidence, upon voir 
dire examination Ms. Rakes testified that she did not know when the identifying 
number in the box in the upper right-hand corner of the document was put on 
the document or who put it there. She also testified that she did not know 
when the document was dated, or by whom. (Tr. 26-27.) 
Thereafter the court inquired of counsel: 
"Do you have an objection to the receipt of the document 
[Exhibit 2-P] as a business record? 
"Mr. Marshall: Of course I do have an objection to the 
receipt of the document as to what the document purports 
to be, Your Honor, for any purpose. Now, she can say she 
found it in the company files, [which the witness had not 
stated in her testimony at that point] but beyond that I donTt 
think this witness is qualified to testify to this by her own 
testimony here, Your Honor. On that basis I would object 
to the admission of that document. 
"Judge Billings: Well, the objection as to the receipt of 
Exhibit 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 as to them being received as 
business records will be overruled but counsel may have— 
"(Whereupon, plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 1 through 6 were 
offered and received into evidence at this time.)" (Tr. 28-29.) 
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Subsequently, similar objections were preserved as to the other 
documents claimed as guarantees (Exhibits 9-P, 16-P, 23-P and 30-P) which 
were also admitted into evidence upon the basis that they were business records 
of the plaintiff. (Tr. 35.) 
It is respectfully submitted that no proper foundation was laid for 
introducing these exhibits into evidence even upon the basis that they were 
business records, since no one had presented any evidence up to that point as 
to where the documents came from. 
Subsequently, the defendants testified that they had executed certain 
guarantee agreements upon forms presented bv plaintiff, but that those forms 
were submitted to plaintiff in connection with other lease proposals which the 
plaintiff later declined to fund, and that those forms were executed in blank, 
in the sense that neither the date nor the identifying number were filled in at 
the time they were executed and delivered to plaintiff. 
This testimony of the defendants was uncontroverted, and was 
supported by evidence presented by the plaintiff to the effect that the 
procedures of the plaintiff required that all lease documentation had to be 
executed by the lessee and returned to plaintiff for acceptance, and that 
plaintiff did not assign a number to a lease until it had the documentation 
completed, and had accepted the lease. (Tr. 55.) 
The trial court found that at the time the guarantee agreements were 
presented they were not dated and were not identified by lease number. 
(Finding of Fact No. 6 — copy in Addendum.) 
It is important to note that the identifying number is the only thing 
on the document which ties the guarantee to any specific lease. However, 
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no evidence was presented at any time to indicate the identity of the person 
who put these numbers on the guarantee agreements or the circumstances 
under which they were put on those documents. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred in admitting 
Exhibits 2-P, 9-P, 16-P, 23-P and 30-P into evidence for any purpose. 
§78-25-17, U.C.A., 1953, reads as follows: 
"The party producing as genuine a writing which has been 
altered, or appears to have been altered after its execution 
in a part material to the question in dispute must account 
for the appearance of alteration. He may show that the 
alteration was made by another without his concurrence, or 
was made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or 
otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration 
does not change the meaning or language of the instrument. 
If he does this, he may give the writing in evidence, but not 
otherwise?' (Emphasis added. See copy in Addendum.) 
It should be noted here that filling in blanks is considered as an 
alteration of the document. See, First National Bank in Dallas v. Walker, 544 
S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1976); Farmers State Bank of Yuma v. Klein, 410 P.2d 632 
(Colo. 1966.). 
Since there was no evidence presented to the trial court showing the 
identity of the person(s) who put the identifying numbers on the exhibits in 
question or the circumstances under which they were put there, the court 
erred in admitting them into evidence. Without those documents in evidence 
the finding of the trial court that defendants guaranteed the leases in issue 
would be unsupported in the evidence, and contrary to the Utah Statute of 
Frauds, §25-5-4(2) U.C.A., 1953. (See copy in Addendum.) 
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POINT FOUR: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ANY 
JUDGMENT FOR RESIDUAL OR SALVAGE VALUE. 
During the course of the trial proceedings the parties stipulated that 
the equipment which was the subject of the lease agreements had a residual 
value of five percent (Tr. 85.) No other evidence was presented to the trial 
court with reference to this residual value. 
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the trial court 
concluded that plaintiff "should be awarded the residual value of the equipment," 
in the amount of $23,805.65 (Conclusions of Law No. 5(b) — See Addendum). 
According to the discussion of this court in Pro-Printers, supra, the 
residual value normally refers to the amount for which the equipment could 
be purchased at the conclusion of the lease and therefore, the stipulation that 
the equipment had a residual value of five percent was material to the 
determination that the leases were in reality financing agreements. 
However, no evidence was presented to the court in this case that 
the lessee had ever agreed to pay plaintiff the residual value of the equipment. 
The leases do not impose any such obligation on the lessee. Furthermore, the 
leases do contain an integration clause which states: "This instrument 
constitutes the entire agreement between lessor and lessee. . • ." (See paragraph 
26 of Exhibits 1-P, 8-P, 15-P, 22-P and 29-P. Emphasis added.) 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the court erred in including 
an award for residual value in any amount in the judgment. 
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POINT FIVE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE AMOUNT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF. 
During the course of the trial Mr. Bruce Reading, counsel for plaintiff, 
desired to present his own testimony as to the amount of attorney's fees which 
he claimed should be awarded. Counsel for defendants stated that they would 
accept a proffer. (Tr. 99.) Thereupon, according to the transcript, the 
following occurred: 
"Mr. Reading: Your Honor, I would proffer that ITm an 
attorney of the Utah State Bar and that our office has an 
across-the-board billing rate of $75.00 per hour whether it is 
a senior attorney or first associate out of school, that we 
have spent significant time not only in preparation for this 
trial but also in the various motions that were heard before 
on the default judgment and memorandum that we've 
submitted in regards to that. We feel a reasonable attorney's 
fee in the prosecution of this case is $10,000.00. 
"Judge Billings: Just for the benefit of counsel, this 
court, if, in fact, it ends up awarding a judgment for 
attorneys fee, feels that pursuant to our local rules that 
that would not be sufficient and will ask, if you could, get 
accounting sheets and simply attach it to an affidavit. But 
thereTs no reason for you to testify in court as to that if 
itTs acceptable to counsel. 
"Mr. Marshall: That's acceptable. 
"Mr. Barber: Thatfs fine." (Tr. 99-100. Emphasis added.) 
Thereafter, on March 11, 1985, two weeks after the trial concluded, 
Mr. Reading filed with the court an affidavit, to which he attached copies of 
his billings to plaintiff. In the affidavit, Mr. Reading stated: 
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tT3. That the actual time expended and billed in the 
above matter is Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-Five 
Dollars and Fifty Cents ($13,485.50). 
^F ^F *r F^ ^F 
"5. Based upon the amount in controversy and the 
defenses raised, a reasonable attorney's fee in this action 
should be Seventeen Thousand Dollars ($17,000.00)." (R. 223-
224. Emphasis added.) 
On March 15, 1985, counsel for defendants filed with the court 
Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, 
in which among other things they objected to an award of attorney's fees as 
set forth in the proposed judgment ($17,000.00), upon the basis that counsel 
for plaintiff had testified that the amount of attorney's fee which he sought 
was $10,000.00. (R. 213.) 
The trial court awarded attorney's fees in the sum of $13,485.00. 
(See Judgment in Addendum.) 
It is respectfully submitted that the court's invitation to which counsel 
for defendants agreed was for counsel for plaintiff to justify by affidavit his 
testimony that a reasonable attorney's fee was in the amount of $10,000.00. 
It was not an open-ended invitation or consent that a different amount could 
be submitted to or awarded by the court. 
Consequently, it is submitted that in the event this court finds that 
any amount of attorney's fee should be awarded, which defendants do not 
admit, plaintiff should be limited to the sum of $10,000.00. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully submit, in the alternative: 
1. That the judgment of the lower court should be reversed because 
the evidence presented at trial did not show that plaintiff disposed of any part 
of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. 
2. That the judgment of the trial court should be reversed because 
the trial court correctly concluded that the retention of the art piece by 
plaintiff was not a commercially reasonable disposition, which should preclude 
plaintiff from obtaining any deficiency judgment. 
3. That the judgment of the trial court should be reversed because 
the finding of the court that defendants had guaranteed the leases in question 
was based upon evidence which was improperly admitted into evidence. 
4. That the judgment of the trial court should be reduced by the 
sum of $23,805.65 (plus interest calculated thereon) because the plaintiff is 
not entitled to any award based on the residual value of the equipment. 
5. That the judgment of the trial court for attorneys fees should 
be reduced to an amount not in exess of $10,000.00. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING n - , 
I hereby certify that I served four copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF upon the plaintiff, by maiHtig the same to Plaintiff's 
Attorney, J. Bruce Reading, 261 East 300 South, Second Floor, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 on this y&™( day of August, 1985. 
X^juoJ2r> V^OJ^UJM. 
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ADDENDUM 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
JUDGMENT 
SECTION 70A-9-504(3), U.C.A. 1953 
SECTION 34-21-963(c), WYOMING STATUTES, 1977 
SECTION 25-5-4, U.C.A. 1953 
SECTION 78-25-17, U.C.A. 1953 
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J. BRUCE READING, No. 2 7 00 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-7870 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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IFG LEASING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BONNEVILLE DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION d/b/a RAMADA INN, 
EVANSTON, WYOMING, et al., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C-83-8536 
Judge Judith M. Billings 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before 
the Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge of the above-entitled 
Court, during the time period of February 21, 1985 through February 
25, 1985, with the plaintiff being represented by Mr. Bruce 
Reading, attorney at law, the defendants Hansen and Gordon being 
represented by Mr. James Barber, attorney at law, and defendant 
Nelson being represented by Mr. John Marshall, attorney at law, 
and the Court having heard evidence and accepted exhibits and hav-
ing reviewed both testimony and documents after taking the matter 
under advisement now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the defendants are residents of Salt Lake 
County, and the Court has jurisdiction of both the individual 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
defendants and the subject matter of this litigation. 
2. That the corporate defendants Ecotek National 
n/k/a Irving Financial Corporation and Bonneville Development 
Corporation are Utah corporations doing business in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and presently, are under the protection 
of the United States Bankruptcy Court having filed Chapter 11 
proceedings. 
3. That during the time period of October 1980 through 
September 1981, the individual defendants were principals in 
the control and operation of Bonneville Development Corporation, 
each serving on the board of directors and as officers of the 
corporation, and holding existing shareholder interests or the 
right to acquire that position. 
4. That the defendant Bonneville Development Corpora-
tion d/b/a Ramada Inn, Evanston, Wyoming executed and delivered 
to the plaintiff the following leases on or about the dates 
indicated: 
a. On or about March 6, 1983, lease no. 56809; 
b. On or about May 14, 1981, lease no. 56810; 
c. On or about June 20, 1981, lease no. 56811; 
d. On or about July 29, 1981, lease no. 56812; and 
e. On or about September 3, 1981, lease no. 57938. 
5. That on or about the dates of the execution of 
each of the five leases, each of the individual defendants, 
Hansen, Gordon, and Nelson, executed a continuing and unconditional 
guaranty agreement whereby they agreed to perform, pay, and 
9 _ _ _ 
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discharge all of the defendant Bonneville Development Corporation's 
obligations under the respective lease agreements. 
6. At the time when guaranty agreements were presented 
with each of the above five leases, the guaranty agreements 
were not dated and were not identified by lease number. 
7. That each of the five leases were funded by the 
plaintiff, and the defendant Bonneville Development Corporation 
received the use of personal property pursuant to those leases. 
8. That the last payment made by the defendants under 
any of the lease contracts was on May 13, 1982. 
9. Plaintiff attempted to force payments during the 
summer of 1982, but did not repossess the collateral. 
10. The defendant Bonneville Development Corporation 
d/b/a Ramada Inn, Evanston, Wyoming was placed in receivership 
on the 5th day of October, 1982. 
11. That the defendant Bonneville Development Corporation 
filed for protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Utah on May 31, 1983. 
12. That on or about March 30, 1984, letters were 
sent to the defendants Gordon, Hansen, and Nelson informing 
them of the date after which the personal property, which was 
the subject matter of the leases, would be sold at private or 
public sale. 
13. The personal property was sold to Commercial Security 
Bank and First Security Bank during the month of September, 
1984 at private sale for the amount of Eighty Five Thousand 
Dollars ($85,000.00). 
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14. Expert witness testimony placed the value of the 
personal property at fifteen to twenty-five percent of the original 
purchase value. The actual amount received was approximately 
eighteen percent (18%) of its original value. 
15. No written notification of acceleration of payments 
pursuant to paragraph 19(b) of the leases was ever sent by the 
plaintiff to the defendants. Such notification was only given by 
filing of the complaint in this matter on or about 12th day of 
December, 1983. 
16. As a part of plaintifffs bargain, it had established 
residual or salvage value in the equipment of Twenty-Three Thousand 
Eight Hundred Five Dollars and Sixty-Five Cents ($23,805.63). 
17. At the time of the sale of the personal property, 
a wood carving was retained by the plaintiff and not sold with 
the other personal property. 
18. A check in the amount of Six Thousand Dollars 
($6,000.00) paid by the plaintiff for certain items of personal 
property under the leases was never cashed. 
19. Attached hereto, as appendix "A" to these findings, 
is the recap of all amounts due and owing and amounts credited 
under each of the leases for the sale of equipment. 
20. The defendant Bonneville Development Corporation 
agreed, pursuant to the lease agreements, to pay any reasonable 
attorney fees. 
21. Plaintiff's counsel has submitted an affidavit 
in support of attorney's fees with said affidavit incorporating 
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actual time and charges made in this matter. 
22. All of the parties agree that the leases were, 
in fact, financing agreements that were subject to the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now 
enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the guaranties of the individual defendants, 
Rodney F. Gordon, Jim Hansen, and Frank A. Nelson (exhibits 
2, 9, 16, 23, and 30) were intended by the parties to guarantee 
the leases entered into by Bonneville Corporation and are legally 
binding contracts. Although these documents may have been blank 
as to lease number, date, and even the equipment covered, the 
defendants knew or should have known that the documents were 
intended for the five leases at issue. 
2. That the sale of the collateral was commercially 
reasonable and conformed to the requirements of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. The sale was a private sale, after notice 
was given to the individual defendants, and the price obtained 
was commercially reasonable. 
3. The Court finds that the sale of the wood carving 
was not commercially reasonable and allows an offset of Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) for the price of this carving. 
4. The Court finds that the Six Thousand Dollar 
($6,000.00) check that was not cashed should also be allowed 
as an offset. 
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5. The Court finds that the damages should be computed 
as follows: 
a. All principal amounts due and owing as of 
the date of the filing of the complaint should earn interest 
at the the statutory rate of ten percent (10%) per annum. 
b. The plaintiff should be awarded the residual 
value of the equipment in the amount of Twenty-Three Thousand 
Eight Hundred Five Dollars and Sixty-Five Cents ($23,805.65). 
c. The amount of damages pursuant to lease 
number 56809 is One Hundred Sixty-Three Thousand Nine Hundred 
Ninety-Seven Thousand and Ninety-Seven Cents ($163,997.97). 
d. The amount of damages pursuant to lease 
number 56810 is One Hundred Seventy-Four Thousand Eight Hundred 
Seventy-Nine Dollars and Fourteen Cents ($174,879.14). 
e. The amount of damages pursuant to lease 
number 56811 is Three Hundred Five Thousand Eight Hundred 
Forty-Five Dollars and Sixty-Three Cents ($305,845.63). 
f. The amount of damages pursuant to lease 
number 56812 is One Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Six Hundred 
Seventy-Seven Dollars and Ninety-Two Cents ($148,677.92). 
g. The amount of damages pursuant to lease 
number 57938 is Twenty-One Thousand Four Hundred Sixteen Dollars 
and Ninety-One Cents ($21,416.91). 
The total amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff 
is Eight Hundred Thirty-Eight Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-Three 
Dollars and Twenty-Two Cents ($838,623.22). 
9 9 A 
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6. Defendants should be awarded an offset against 
these damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000,00) 
and Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) for the unpaid check. 
7. The total amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff 
should be Eight Hundred Twenty-Two Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-
Three Dollars and Twenty-Two Cents ($822,623.22). 
8. In addition to the foregoing, plaintiff should 
t(u>iujv- Ttau^*<* TAUAJ 
be awarded i ts attorney's fees ,in the amount of fipypnteen Thou&af»d 
/iui^c^txiU^ C ^ 
-Dollars (?r7, 000.00) .' J £/-J^ 
9. Plaintiff should be awarded its costs incurred 
herein in the amount of Three Hundred Two Dollars ($302.00). 
DATED this l9 day of March, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HJNDLEY 
Citrfc ML /?)• £J/M 
0«*>uty Oimrk 
Judith M. Billings 
District Court Judge Y2-
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that on the ,%£• day of March, 1985, 
I mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law to the following: 
John G. Marshall 
Attorney for defendant Nelson 
525 East 300 South, No. 102 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
James N. Barger 
Attorney for defendants Hansen and Gordon 
255 East 400 South, No. 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ATTACHMENT A to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law _ 
IFG Leasing Company v. Bonneville Development Corporation, Civil ho. C-83-8536 
Amount Interest 
Lease (Remaining lease Amounts Received 10% from 12/12/83 Ba^ 
Number Date payments) Accounts Receivable Sales Taxes (Date complaint filed) I 
56809 
56810 
56811 
56812 
57938 
5/13/82 
9/28/84 
2/21/85 
5/13/82 
9/28/84 
2/12/85 
5/13/82 
9/28/84 
2/21/85 
5/13/82 
9/28/84 
2/12/85 
5/13/82 
9/28/84 
2/21/85 
$162,280.08 
$172,385.24 
$301,486.67 
$146,558.34 
$21,111.46 
$16,982.84 
$17,397.21 
$30,428.76 
$14,791.41 
$2,130.55 
$679.31 
$695.89 
$1,217.15 
$591.65 
$85.23 
**$12,849.03 
$ 5,851.70 
**$i3,649.13 
$ 6,241.98 
**$23,871.14 
$10,916.58 
**$11,604.21 
$ 5,306.78 
$ 1,671.56 
$764.44 
$162, 
$158, 
$163, 
$172, 
$168, 
$174, 
$301, 
$294, 
$305. 
$146, 
$143, 
$148. 
$21, 
$20, 
$21. 
••Calculated from date of filing of complaint, December 12, 1983. Total: $838, 
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J. BRUCE READING, No. 2700 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IFG LEASING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
BONNEVILLE DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION d/b/a RAMADA INN, 
EVANSTON, WYOMING, et al. , 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
3t? $£T - Z'J ^fjfy 
Civil No. C-83-8536 
Judge Judith M. Billings 
The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court from 
February 21, 1985 through February 25, 1985 with the plaintiff 
appearing through its authorized representatives and through 
its counsel, J. Bruce Reading, the defendants Hansen and Gordon 
being represented by Mr. James Barber, attorney at law, and the 
defendant Nelson appearing in person and being represented by 
Mr. John Marshall, attorney at law, and the Court having heretofore 
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law now enters 
the following judgment. 
1. The guaranties of the individual defendants 
Rodney F. Gordon, Jim Hansen, and Frank A. Nelson (exhibits 
2, 9, 16, 23, and 30) were intended by the parties to guarantee 
the lease agreements entered into by Bonneville Development 
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Corporation and are legally binding contracts. 
2. The sale of the collateral was commercially 
reasonable and conformed to the requirements of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. The sale of the wood carving was not commercially 
reasonable. 
3. It is ordered that the defendants be allowed the 
following offsets: 
a. Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) for the wood 
carving; and 
check. 
b. Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) for the uncashed 
4. All principal amounts due and owing as of the date 
of the filing of the complaint shall earn interest at the 
statutory rate of ten percent (10%) per annum. 
5. Damages shall be computed regarding the leases as 
follows: 
a. Residual value in the equipment: 
b. Damages pursuant to 
lease number 56809: 
c. Damages pursuant to 
lease number 56810: 
d. Damages pursuant to 
lease number 56811: 
e. Damages pursuant to 
lease number 56812: 
f. Damages pursuant to 
lease number 56938 
Total amount of damages suffered 
by plaintiff: 
$23,805.65 
$163,997.97 
$174,879.14 
$305,845.63 
$148,677.92 
$21,416.91 
$838,623.22 
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6. The total amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff 
shall be Eight Hundred Twenty-Two Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-Three 
Dollars.and Twenty-Two Cents ($822,623.22), and judgment is hereby 
awarded to the plaintiff and against the defendants in said amount. 
7. In addition, plaintiff shall be^awarded its reasonable 
[v n,j<6S\rD J QA . 
attorney's fees in the sum of SuvcuLueii Tliuaaand Dollars 
(•$•17! OOCUjH)) . 
8. Plaintiff should be awarded its costs incurred 
in the amount of Three Hundred Two Dollars ($302.00). 
9. The above amounts shall accrue interest at the rate 
of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of judgment until 
paid in full. 
DATED this ffi day of March, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: ATTEST 
H. DIXON HiNDLEY 
Cfctf* < 
C^ni^C2).i\c\zf<r _ 
Deputy Cfcwfc 
ay, /?). /3J/M.X 
J j ^ l t h M. Bi l l ings 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that on the 
ffVr 
day of March, 1985, 
I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing Judgment to the following: 
Mr. John G. Marshall 
Attorney for defendant Nelson 
525 East 300 South, No. 102 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. James N. Barber 
Attorney for defendants Hansen and Gordon 
255 East 400 South, No. 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
^^yiuvtipi^ 
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70A-9-504. Secured party's right to dispose of collateral after 
default — Effect of disposition. 
* * * * * 
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceed-
ings and may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or 
other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time 
and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition 
including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be com-
mercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens 
to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a 
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of 
any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which 
. any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall 
be sent by the secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed 
after default a statement renouncing or modifying his right to noti-
fication of sale. In the case of consumer goods no other notification 
need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to any other 
secured party from whom the secured party has received (before 
sending his notification to the debtor or before the debtor's renun-
ciation of his rights) written notice of a claim of an interest in the 
collateral. The secured party may buy at any public sale and if the 
collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or 
is of a type which is the subject of widely distributed standard 
price quotations he may buy at private sale. 
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WYOMING STATUTES 1977 
§ 34-21-963, Secured party's right to d ispose of collateral 
after default; effect of disposit ion (9-504). 
* * * * * 
(c) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or privale proceedings and 
may be made by way of one (1) or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may 
be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every 
aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms 
must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to 
decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, 
reasonable notificalion of the lime and place of any public sale or reasonable 
notification of the lime after which any private sale or other intended disposition 
is lo be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor, and except in the 
case of consumer goods to any other person who has a security interest in the 
collateral and who has duly filed a financing statement indexed in the name of 
the debtor in this state or who is known by the secured party to have a security 
interest in the collateral. The secured party may' buyat any public sale and'if 
the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type 
which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations he may buy 
nl private sale. 
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25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed. In 
the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, 
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party 
to be charged therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within 
one year from the making thereof. 
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of 
another. 
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon consideration 
of marriage, except mutual promises to marry. 
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or administrator to 
answer in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator 
or intestate out of his own estate. 
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78-25-17, "Writings bearing obvious alterations—Explanation required. 
~The. party producing as genuine a writing which has been, altered, or 
appears to have been altered after its execution in a part material to 
the question in dispute , must account for the appearance of alteration. 
He may show that the alteration was made by another without his 
concurrence, or was made with the consent of" the parties affected by it, 
or otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration does 
not change .the meaning or language of the instrument.. If he .does this, 
he. may give the writing in evidence, but not otherwise. 
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